Introduction

Can a trader use a registered trademark or an expression forming part of another person’s registered trademark on its product packaging merely by describing it as a generic or descriptive expression?

Does the use of a prominent brand name alongside the manufacturer’s own trademark automatically protect the manufacturer from an allegation of trademark infringement?

These questions arise frequently in trademark disputes involving food products, where expressions may have both descriptive and commercial significance.

In an important judgment dated 27 October 2026, the Kerala High Court, in Greenmount Spices Private Limited v. Wipro Enterprises Private Limited, F.A.O. No. 95 of 2026, examined the limits of the descriptive-use defence under Section 30(2)(a) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

The dispute concerned the use of the expression “Brahmin Sambar Powder” by Greenmount Spices Private Limited, while Wipro Enterprises Private Limited claimed rights over the trademark “Brahmins”, including in relation to food products.

The appellant contended that its distinctive trademark was “Greenmount” and that the expression “Brahmin Sambar Powder” was used merely to describe the product. The respondent, on the other hand, asserted that “Brahmins” was its registered trademark, had acquired distinctiveness through longstanding commercial use and was being infringed by the appellant.

The Kerala High Court declined to interfere with the temporary injunction granted by the Additional District Court, Ernakulam. The Court held that Section 30(2)(a) does not confer an unrestricted right to use a registered expression merely because the user characterises it as descriptive. The nature of the use must be examined in the context of the product packaging, the prominence and placement of the words, the relative size of the expressions and the overall impression on consumers.

The judgment is particularly significant because it explains why the descriptive-use defence, prior-use claims and allegations of peaceful coexistence may require examination at trial rather than final determination at the interlocutory stage.

Case Details

1.Background and Facts of the Dispute

Wipro Enterprises Private Limited instituted O.S. No. 22 of 2024 before the II Additional District Court, Ernakulam, against Greenmount Spices Private Limited.

The suit sought to restrain Greenmount Spices from manufacturing, advertising, selling, distributing, offering for sale or exporting food products, including sambar powder, by using the respondent’s trademark or any identical or deceptively similar mark.

The relief specifically covered the use of the expressions “BRAHMINS” and “BRAHMINS SAMBAR POWDER” on product packaging, websites, as a trade name or domain name, either independently or as part of another mark, with or without a prefix or suffix.

Along with the suit, Wipro Enterprises filed an application for temporary injunction seeking substantially the same relief.

The Trial Court allowed the application. Aggrieved by the injunction, Greenmount Spices preferred an appeal before the Kerala High Court.

 The respondent’s claim over the trademark

Wipro Enterprises contended that it had acquired the Brahmins group business, together with the trademark and goodwill, in 2023.

The respondent asserted that:

• Its predecessor had launched “Brahmins Sambar Powder” in 1989 using a distinctive recipe.
• The trademark “Brahmins” had acquired distinctiveness through continuous use and promotion.
• It held 29 registrations for the word “Brahmins”, which was claimed as a dominant feature in relation to food products.
• Its products were marketed through an extensive distribution network in India and abroad.
• Consumer complaints had brought to its notice the appellant’s use of the expression “Brahmin Sambar Powder”.
• The use of the expression was allegedly causing confusion among consumers.

The respondent relied on trademark registration certificates and other documents to support its claim of ownership and prior commercial use.

 The appellant’s defence

Greenmount Spices disputed the allegation of infringement.

Its principal contention was that its trademark was “Greenmount” and that the expression “Brahmin Sambar Powder” was used only descriptively to identify the product.

The appellant argued that:

1. “Brahmin Sambar Powder” was a generic and descriptive expression.
2. The word “Brahmin” denoted a traditional Hindu community having a cultural association, and sambar was an integral part of its cuisine.
3. The use was protected by Section 30(2)(a) of the Trade Marks Act.
4. The appellant had been using the expression “Greenmount Brahmin Sambar Powder” continuously since 2011.
5. The products of both parties had coexisted in the market for years without consumer confusion.
6. The respondent’s predecessor had applied for registration only on 6 June 2008, and therefore could not claim an exclusive right over the expression “Brahmins Sambar Powder”.

The appellant also relied on Sections 15 and 17 of the Trade Marks Act and contended that the Trial Court had failed to appreciate the distinction between its principal trademark and the descriptive expression appearing on the product.

2.Questions Considered by the Kerala High Court

The principal question before the High Court was whether the order granting temporary injunction suffered from any error or illegality warranting appellate interference.

The dispute required consideration of the following issues:

• Whether the expression “Brahmin Sambar Powder” was being used descriptively within the meaning of Section 30(2)(a).
• Whether the respondent had established a prima facie case of infringement of its registered trademark.
• Whether the appellant’s use of the word “Greenmount” as its distinctive trademark excluded the possibility of infringement through the use of another expression on the same product.
• Whether the appellant’s claim of prior or continuous use and peaceful coexistence could defeat the respondent’s application for temporary injunction.
• Whether the Trial Court had properly applied the three essential principles governing the grant of temporary injunction.

The High Court emphasised that the question at the interlocutory stage was not whether infringement had been finally established, but whether the materials on record justified preservation of the respondent’s claimed rights until the suit was decided.

3.Statutory Framework under the Trade Marks Act, 1999

The Court examined Sections 27, 28, 29, 30 and 135 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

 A.Section 27 – No action for infringement of an unregistered trademark

Section 27(1) provides that no person is entitled to institute proceedings to prevent or recover damages for infringement of an unregistered trademark.

However, Section 27(2) preserves the independent remedy of passing off.

Therefore, the statutory protection against infringement of a registered trademark and the common-law remedy of passing off operate within distinct legal frameworks.

B.Section 28 – Rights conferred by registration

Section 28(1) provides that valid registration confers upon the registered proprietor the exclusive right to use the trademark in relation to the goods or services for which it is registered and to obtain relief in respect of infringement.

However, this right is subject to the other provisions of the Act and any conditions or limitations attached to the registration.

The right conferred by registration must therefore be considered together with the statutory limitations and defences available under the Act.

C.Section 29 – Infringement of registered trademarks

Section 29 identifies the circumstances in which the use of a mark may amount to infringement.

Under Section 29(1), infringement may arise where a person, not being the registered proprietor or a permitted user, uses in the course of trade an identical or deceptively similar mark in relation to the goods or services for which the trademark is registered, in such a manner as to render the use likely to be taken as use of a trademark.

Section 29(2) addresses infringement arising from different combinations of identity or similarity between the competing marks and the goods or services, where such use is likely to cause confusion or association with the registered trademark.

Section 29(5) specifically deals with the use of a registered trademark as a trade name or part of a trade name or business name in relation to goods or services for which the trademark is registered.

Section 29(6) further explains the different forms of use of a registered trademark, including affixing the mark to goods or packaging, offering goods for sale, importing or exporting goods under the mark and using the mark in business papers or advertising.

D. Section 30 – Limits on the effect of registered trademarks

Section 30 provides statutory limitations on the rights conferred by registration.

Of particular relevance was Section 30(2)(a), which provides that a registered trademark is not infringed where the use in relation to goods or services indicates their kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, geographical origin, time of production or other characteristics.

The appellant relied principally on this provision, contending that “Brahmin Sambar Powder” merely indicated the nature or characteristics of the product.

The High Court examined the scope of this defence and clarified that the provision cannot be treated as an unrestricted licence to use a registered expression.

E.Section 135 – Relief in suits for infringement or passing off

Section 135 provides for reliefs available in suits for infringement or passing off, including injunctions, damages or an account of profits, and orders relating to delivery-up of infringing labels and marks.

Section 135(2) also recognises the power of the Court to grant ex parte injunctions and interlocutory orders concerning discovery of documents, preservation of infringing goods and evidence, and restraint against disposal of assets in specified circumstances.

4.Section 30(2)(a): Descriptive Use Is Not an Unrestricted Defence

One of the most important observations in the judgment appears in paragraph 11.

The appellant argued that the expression “Brahmin Sambar Powder” was descriptive and that its use was therefore protected under Section 30(2)(a).

The High Court rejected the proposition that merely describing an expression as descriptive would automatically bring its use within the statutory protection.

The Court held:“Section 30(2)(a) does not confer an unrestricted licence to use a registered expression merely because the user characterises it as descriptive.”

The Court explained that the application of Section 30(2)(a) depends on whether, viewed in its context, the expression is genuinely used to indicate the kind or another characteristic of the goods.

Equally, the existence of a trademark registration does not relieve the proprietor of the obligation to establish the statutory requirements applicable to the claim.

The Court identified the following factors as relevant to the assessment:

• The particulars of the competing trademark registrations.
• The overall presentation of the product.
• The prominence of the disputed expression on the packaging.
• The placement of the words.
• The relative size of the different expressions.
• The presence of other distinctive features.

These matters could not be conclusively determined at the interlocutory stage and required a full-fledged trial.

Significance of the observation

The judgment makes an important distinction between the description of a product and the commercial use of an expression in a manner that may identify or suggest a trade source.

An expression may be descriptive in ordinary language. However, its presentation on the product packaging may create a different commercial impression.

Consequently, the descriptive-use defence cannot be determined merely by examining the dictionary meaning or ordinary meaning of the words. The manner in which the expression is used in the marketplace is also relevant.

5.Use of the Manufacturer’s Own Trademark Does Not Automatically Exclude Infringement

Another significant aspect of the judgment concerns the appellant’s argument that its distinctive trademark was “Greenmount”.

The appellant contended that “Brahmin Sambar Powder” was only a product description and that the presence of the Greenmount trademark sufficiently distinguished its products from those of the respondent.

The High Court held that the use of one trademark to identify the manufacturer does not, by itself, answer the question of infringement arising from the use of another expression.

The Court observed that:“A product may bear one mark identifying its manufacturer while another expression may be presented in a manner that suggests a commercial association.”

At the same time, the Court cautioned that the mere appearance of a word on product packaging does not automatically establish infringement.

The relevant consideration is how the average consumer is likely to perceive the mark and the product as a whole, having regard to the nature of the goods concerned.

This observation is particularly important in cases involving composite packaging, where a product may carry the manufacturer’s house mark, a product description and other expressions that may independently have trademark significance.

The assessment must therefore consider the overall commercial impression rather than isolating one word or expression from the packaging.

6.Prior Use and the Evidence of Commercial Use

The appellant claimed continuous use of the expression “Greenmount Brahmin Sambar Powder” since 2011.

The respondent, on the other hand, relied on documents indicating that its predecessor’s Brahmins food products had been launched in 1987 and that “Brahmins Sambar Powder” had been launched in 1989.

The High Court referred to the following documents:

• Ext. A1 – Inauguration notice dated 13.07.1987, which prima facie indicated the launch of Brahmins food products in 1987.
• Ext. A2 – Municipal licence dated 04.07.1987, supporting the respondent’s case that its predecessor was licensed to manufacture curry powder.
• Exts. A9 to A28 – Documents relied on to establish trademark registrations incorporating the word “Brahmins”.
• Ext. A23 – Status page and registration certificate relating to the application to substitute the respondent as the subsequent purchaser of the trademark.

The Court noted that, even according to the appellant’s own case, use of the expression “Greenmount Brahmin Sambar Powder” commenced only in 2011.

At the interlocutory stage, the materials prima facie supported the respondent’s claim of prior use.

However, the High Court did not finally determine the competing claims of prior use.

It clarified that the appellant’s plea of prior or continuous use had to be tested against:

1. The precise mark used.
2. The goods in relation to which it was used.
3. The nature and extent of such use.
4. The applicable trademark registration particulars.

The Court also observed that the assertion of peaceful coexistence, by itself, did not settle whether the impugned use was lawful or whether confusion was likely.

These questions were left open for adjudication in the suit.

7.The Average Consumer and the Overall Impression of the Product

The judgment reinforces the importance of examining the overall impression created by a product and its packaging.

The Court did not treat the presence of the word “Greenmount” as conclusive evidence that consumers would necessarily distinguish the appellant’s products from those of the respondent.

Similarly, it did not hold that every use of the word “Brahmin” on a food product would necessarily constitute infringement.

The Court focused on the manner in which the expression was presented and the perception of the average consumer.

This approach is relevant to disputes involving:

• House marks used alongside product names.
• Descriptive expressions that may also function as source identifiers.
• Composite marks containing common or disputed words.
• Product packaging in which different expressions appear with varying prominence.
• Allegations of confusion or commercial association.

The legal inquiry must consider the competing marks and the goods in their actual commercial context.

8. The Three-Fold Test for Grant of Temporary Injunction

The High Court examined the settled principles governing temporary injunctions.

The three essential requirements are:

A.Prima facie case

The plaintiff must establish a serious question requiring adjudication.

A prima facie case does not mean that the plaintiff must establish its claim conclusively at the interim stage. The Court is required to examine whether the claim is bona fide and whether the material placed before it justifies investigation and adjudication at trial.

In the present case, the respondent relied on its trademark registrations and documents indicating prior commercial use of the “Brahmins” mark.

The High Court found that these materials supported the existence of a prima facie case.

B.Balance of convenience

The Court must weigh the comparative hardship likely to be suffered by the parties depending on whether the injunction is granted or refused.

The relevant consideration is not merely the inconvenience caused to the defendant by an injunction. The Court must also consider whether refusal of the injunction would expose the plaintiff to injury that cannot be adequately compensated by damages.

The Court found that the balance of convenience favoured the respondent.

C.Irreparable injury

The plaintiff must demonstrate that refusal of an injunction is likely to cause injury that cannot adequately be compensated through monetary damages.

The High Court observed that, if the impugned use was ultimately found to constitute infringement, its continuation could erode the distinctiveness of the respondent’s trademark and cause injury not readily compensable by damages.

Accordingly, the Court found that the requirement of irreparable injury was also satisfied.

9.Appellate Interference with Discretionary Orders: The Principle in Wander Ltd. v. Antox India Pvt. Ltd.

The respondent relied on the Supreme Court decision in:Wander Ltd. & Others v. Antox India Pvt. Ltd., 1990 Supp SCC 727.

The principle laid down in Wander Ltd. is that an appellate court should not ordinarily substitute its own discretion for that exercised by the court of first instance in granting or refusing an interlocutory injunction.

Interference is justified where the discretion has been exercised arbitrarily, capriciously or perversely, or where the court has acted in ignorance of settled legal principles.

The Kerala High Court applied this standard while examining the order of the Trial Court.

The Court found no arbitrariness or perversity in the impugned order warranting appellate interference.

Reliance on Shruti Manav Sharma v. Sunanina Singh

 The High Court also referred to the Supreme Court decision in Shruti Manav Sharma v. Sunanina Singh, 2026 KHC OnLine 6611.

The judgment discussed the principles governing:

• The threshold for establishing a prima facie case.
• Balance of convenience.
• Irreparable injury.
• The discretionary nature of interlocutory injunctions.
• The limited scope of appellate interference.

The Supreme Court reiterated the principle in Wander Ltd. that an appellate court should not substitute its own discretion merely because another view may be possible.

The Kerala High Court applied this approach and held that the Trial Court’s order did not suffer from any infirmity warranting interference.

 10.The Danger of Conducting a Mini-Trial at the Interlocutory Stage

An important part of the judgment concerns the limits of judicial examination at the stage of temporary injunction.

The High Court referred to the observations in Shruti Manav Sharma v. Sunanina Singh concerning the danger of conducting a mini-trial while considering applications under Order XXXIX of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The relevant principle is that an interlocutory proceeding is not the occasion to resolve disputed questions of fact or finally determine the probative value of documents.

The Court relied on the caution expressed in American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd., [1975] AC 396, and the principles recognised by the Supreme Court in Colgate Palmolive (India) Ltd. v. Hindustan Lever Ltd., (1999) 7 SCC 1.

The scope of examination at the interim stage is confined to determining whether the plaintiff has raised a serious dispute requiring investigation at trial.

The Court should not conduct a detailed examination of the ultimate effect or evidentiary value of documents that properly await proof during trial.

This principle is especially relevant in trademark litigation, where the parties may produce extensive documentary evidence concerning:

• Registration and ownership of trademarks.
• Prior use.
• Commercial reputation and goodwill.
• Nature and extent of market presence.
• Consumer perception.
• Product packaging and presentation.
• Alleged confusion and deceptive similarity.

Such evidence must be considered in the appropriate procedural stage.

The High Court accordingly left the final adjudication of the competing claims to the Trial Court.

11.Other Judicial Precedents Considered

The judgment also referred to several decisions considered by the Trial Court while granting the temporary injunction.

A.Renaissance Hotel Holdings Inc. v. B. Vijaya Sai and Others [2022 KHC 6064]

This decision was noticed in the context of trademark infringement principles.

B.Pernod Ricard India Private Limited & Another v. Karanveer Singh Chhabra [2025 SCC Online SC 1701]

The decision formed part of the authorities considered by the Trial Court in examining the trademark dispute.

C.Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt Sharma v. Navaratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories [AIR 1965 SC 980]

An important Supreme Court authority on trademark infringement and the distinction between infringement and passing off.

D.A.C. Krishnan v. Nambisans Dairy Pvt. Ltd. [1997 KHC 32]

This decision was among the authorities considered by the Trial Court.

D.Rajeev K.P. v. Unais K.K. [2025 KHC 2308]

This decision was also referred to in the context of the principles applicable to the grant of temporary injunction.

E.Midas Hygiene Industries Pvt. Ltd. and Another v. Sudhir Bhatia and Others [2004 KHC 467]

The High Court noticed the Supreme Court’s observation that in cases involving infringement of a trademark or copyright, an injunction would ordinarily follow.

These authorities were considered in the context of the prima facie case and the grant of interlocutory relief.

12.Final Findings and Decision of the Kerala High Court

After examining the rival contentions, statutory provisions and materials on record, the Kerala High Court concluded that the respondent had established a prima facie case supported by materials indicating prior commercial use of the “Brahmins” trademark.

The Court also found that the balance of convenience favoured the respondent.

It further held that if the impugned use was ultimately found to constitute infringement, continued use could erode the distinctiveness of the respondent’s trademark and cause injury not readily compensable through damages.

The Court clarified that these conclusions were tentative and would not prejudice the final adjudication of the suit.

Finding no arbitrariness or perversity in the Trial Court’s order, the High Court dismissed the appeal.

The Trial Court was specifically directed to decide the suit in accordance with law, untrammelled by any observation made either in the impugned order or in the High Court judgment.

Thus, the temporary injunction granted by the II Additional District Court, Ernakulam, remained in force, subject to the final adjudication of the suit.

13.Practical Implications for Trademark Owners and Businesses

The judgment provides useful guidance to businesses, trademark proprietors and legal practitioners involved in trademark disputes.

A.Descriptive use must be genuine and context-specific

A trader cannot automatically claim protection under Section 30(2)(a) merely by describing a disputed expression as descriptive.

The actual use of the expression must genuinely indicate the kind or characteristics of the goods.

The manner in which the words are displayed and perceived in the marketplace is relevant.

 B.Use of a house mark is not an automatic defence

The presence of the manufacturer’s own trademark on the packaging does not necessarily exclude infringement.

A product may carry one mark identifying its manufacturer while another expression may suggest a commercial association with a different proprietor.

Businesses should therefore examine the complete presentation of their products before adopting expressions that may resemble another registered trademark.

 C.Packaging and presentation can become decisive evidence

In a trademark dispute involving product packaging, the relative size, prominence, placement and visual presentation of the competing expressions may become significant.

Businesses should maintain records of their packaging designs, product labels, advertising material and the dates from which particular expressions have been used.

D.Prior use must be established with proper evidence

A claim of prior or continuous use must be supported by evidence relating to the precise mark, the relevant goods, the nature and extent of use and the applicable registration particulars.

The mere assertion of longstanding use or peaceful coexistence may not be sufficient.

E.Trademark registration does not eliminate all statutory defences

Registration confers important statutory rights under Section 28, but those rights remain subject to the limitations and exceptions contained in the Trade Marks Act.

The proprietor must establish the necessary ingredients of infringement, while the defendant may rely on applicable statutory defences such as Section 30.

F.Courts should avoid final findings at the interim stage

The judgment is also significant for advocates conducting trademark litigation.

At the stage of an application for temporary injunction, the focus should be on establishing the three-fold test rather than attempting to prove the entire case as if the matter were at final hearing.

A detailed examination of disputed evidence and the ultimate rights of the parties should ordinarily be left to the trial.

14.Conclusion

The decision in Greenmount Spices Private Limited v. Wipro Enterprises Private Limited is an important reminder that the descriptive-use defence under Section 30(2)(a) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, is not an unrestricted licence to use an expression that is also claimed as a registered trademark.

The legal character of an expression must be assessed in the context of its actual commercial use, including its prominence, placement, relative size and overall presentation on the product.

The judgment also clarifies that the use of a manufacturer’s own trademark does not, by itself, answer an allegation that another expression on the same product may cause confusion or suggest a commercial association.

At the same time, the Court refrained from finally deciding whether “Brahmin Sambar Powder” was descriptive or infringing. Those questions were left open for trial.

For trademark practitioners, the decision reinforces three important principles: the contextual examination of descriptive use, the evidentiary importance of prior commercial use and the limited scope of appellate interference with discretionary orders granting temporary injunctions.

Businesses should therefore exercise care when adopting product descriptions that contain expressions identical or similar to another party’s registered trademark, particularly where the expression may acquire commercial significance through its presentation and use.

Case Reference

Greenmount Spices Private Limited v. Wipro Enterprises Private Limited, F.A.O. No. 95 of 2026, judgment dated 27 October 2026, High Court of Kerala, 2026:KER:82024.

Coram: The Honourable Mr. Justice C.S. Dias.

Relevant statutory provisions:

1. Section 27 – No action for infringement of unregistered trademark.
2. Section 28 – Rights conferred by registration.
3. Section 29 – Infringement of registered trademarks.
4. Section 30(1) and Section 30(2)(a) – Limits on the effect of registered trademarks and descriptive use.
5. Section 135 – Relief in suits for infringement or passing off.

Important judicial precedents:

1. Wander Ltd. & Others v. Antox India Pvt. Ltd., 1990 Supp SCC 727.
2. Shruti Manav Sharma v. Sunanina Singh, 2026 KHC OnLine 6611.
3. Renaissance Hotel Holdings Inc. v. B. Vijaya Sai and Others, 2022 KHC 6064.
4. Pernod Ricard India Private Limited & Another v. Karanveer Singh Chhabra, 2025 SCC Online SC 1701.
5. Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt Sharma v. Navaratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories, AIR 1965 SC 980.
6. Midas Hygiene Industries Pvt. Ltd. and Another v. Sudhir Bhatia and Others, 2004 KHC 467.

Disclaimer: This article is intended for general legal information and academic discussion. It is based on the judgment identified above and should not be treated as legal advice or as a substitute for examining the complete judgment and applicable law in a particular case.