Section 3 of The Limitation Act, 1963 says that time-barred suits must be dismissed even if the limitation is not pleaded as a defence. The limitation period starts from the date when the cause of action first accrued to the plaintiff, and not when he acquired ‘full knowledge’ about the same.
The instant case is the Civil Appeal before Supreme Court in Nikhila Divyang Mehta & Anr V/s Hitesh P. Sanghvi & Ors [2025 INSC 485] dated April 15, 2025.
Facts of the case
Hitesh P. Sanghvi – Respondent in Civil Appeal before Supreme Court– on 21.11.2017 instituted a suit in the City Civil Court, Ahmedabad, against four persons including Smt. Harshaben Vijay Mehta, Smt. Nikhila Divyang Mehta, Smt. Ami Rajesh Parikh and Shri Nilav Divyang Mehta as defendant Nos.1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively seeking direction from the court to declare the Will dated 04.02.2014 and the Codicil dated 20.09.2014 executed by his late father Pramod Kesurdas Sanghavi and all consequential actions thereof to be null and void as also for grant of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from entering into any transaction in furtherance of the aforesaid Will and Codicil.
Defendant Nos.1, 2 and 3 are three sisters of the plaintiff and defendant No.4 is son of defendant No.2.
In the plaint it was stated that the deceased took his last breath on 21.10.2014 and in the first week of November, 2014, defendant Nos.1, 2 and 3 revealed to the plaintiff that the deceased had executed a Will and a Codicil as referred to above .
The Defendants took the objection that the plaint is barred by limitation as per article 58 of The Limitation Act, 1963
Findings of City Civil Court, Ahmedabad
The court, upon the plain reading of the averments made in the plaint, held that the action for the suit first arose in the first week of November, 2014 whereas the suit was filed on 21.11.2017. As per the averments made by the plaintiff that he had come to know of the Will and the Codicil in the first week of November, 2014, in view of Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963,2 the suit ought to have been filed within three years when the right to sue first accrued. Since the suit was not filed within three years i.e., by the first week of November, 2017, it is patently barred by limitation.
Appeal to High Court
The High Court on appeal reversed the impugned judgment and order of City Civil Court for the reason that the parties ought to have been permitted to lead evidence on the point of limitation and that the plaint was not liable to be rejected in part, as apart from seeking declaration of the Will and the Codicil to be null and void, there were other reliefs which were sought in the plaint.
The High Court distinguished between “having knowledge” and “full knowledge” to hold that the suit is not barred by limitation as the limitation would reckon from the date of full knowledge.
Appeal to Supreme Court
Supreme Court noted that the prayers made in the plaint are primarily for seeking declaration of the aforesaid Will and Codicil to be null and void as also all actions in pursuance thereof. The relief for permanent injunction is dependent upon the success of the first relief. Therefore, the relief of permanent injunction is simply a consequential relief. The primary relief being for declaring the Will and the Codicil to be null and void.
There is no dispute about he execution and registration of the Will and the odicil. The plaintiff, as per his own averments in plaint, had acquired knowledge of the aforesaid Will and Codicil through defendant Nos. 1, 2 and 3 (sisters), only in the first week of November, 2017.
The relief of declaration claimed in the suit fall under Article 58 which provides for a limitation period of three years.
The use of the words “when the right to sue first accrues” as mentioned in Article 58 is very relevant and important. It categorically provides that the limitation of three years has to be counted from the date when the right to sue first accrues.
According to the plaintiff’s own averments the suit had to be brought within time of three years either from the commencement of the cause of action on 04.02.2014 or lastly on 21.10.2014 when his father died or at best when he acquired knowledge of the Will and the Codicil i.e., the first week of November, 2014.
“There is no dispute to the fact that the limitation for filing of the suit falls under Article 58 of the Schedule to the Act wherein the limitation prescribed is three years. It may be pertinent to note that the limitation of three years is from the date when the cause of action first arose. So, according to the plaintiff’s case, the cause of action first arose on 04.02.2014 and, therefore, the limitation would end on 04.02.2017. However, even if the limitation is calculated from the date of knowledge of the Will and/or the Codicil, it would run from the first week of November, 2014 and would end in the first week of November, 2017. The suit admittedly was instituted on 21.11.2017; much beyond the first week of November, 2017 and as such is apparently barred by limitation, for which neither any defence is required to be looked into nor any evidence in support is needed to be adduced.
Section 3 of the Act contemplates that every suit instituted after the period prescribed under the Act shall be dismissed even if limitation has not been set up as a defence. The aforesaid provision is of a mandatory nature and cannot be ignored by the courts even if not pleaded or argued by the defence. It is obligatory upon the court to dismiss the suit if it is, on the face of it, barred by limitation. The aforesaid provision has been enacted for public good and to give quietus to a remedy after lapse of a particular period, as a matter of public policy, though without extinguishing the right in certain cases.
Therefore, once a limitation prescribed for instituting a cause of action expires and even if limitation is not set up as a defence, it obliges the court to dismiss the suit as barred by limitation.
*****
The submission that limitation is a mixed question of law and fact and that it cannot be decided without allowing the party to lead evidence is of no substance. In the present case, we have earlier noted that the suit was admittedly instituted on 21.11.2017 whereas according to the plaint averments the cause of action first arose on 04.02.2014. Even assuming that the cause of action last arose in the first week of November, 2014, the suit ought to have been filed by 07.11.2017. The suit was filed on 21.11.2017. It was ex-facie barred by limitation for which, no evidence was required to be adduced by the parties. The above issue is purely an issue of fact and in the admitted facts as per the plaint, allegations stand concluded for which no evidence is needed.
The other contention that the plaintiff acquired knowledge of the Will and Codicil in the first week of November, 2014, but that was not a complete knowledge as probably he could read the same subsequently. In dealing with the submission, the appellate Court distinguished between “having knowledge” and “full knowledge” to hold that the suit is not barred by limitation as the limitation would reckon from the date of full knowledge. It is a complete fallacy to make any distinction between “knowledge” and “full knowledge”. First of all, the limitation has to run from the date when the cause of action first accrued and not any subsequent date for the cause of action. According to the plaintiff himself, the cause of action for the suit had arisen much earlier. Secondly, the plaintiff has not pleaded any date on which he acquired complete knowledge and that such argument is only an afterthought and appears to be a simple creation of the first appellate Court Lastly, the first appellate Court has ruled that in the suit, the plaintiff has claimed different reliefs and even if the plaint is barred by limitation in respect of one of the reliefs, it cannot be rejected in toto. The aforesaid submission is also without substance as upon the plain reading of the prayers made in the plaint, it is apparent that the primary relief claimed therein is to declare the Will and the Codicil to be null and void and also all subsequent proceedings thereto. In addition to it, the plaintiff has claimed permanent injunction. The other reliefs are dependent upon the first relief and cannot be granted until and unless the plaintiff succeeds in the first relief. Therefore, once the plaint or the suit in respect of the main relief stands barred by time, the other ancillary relief claimed therein also falls down.”
Accordingly, the judgment and order of the High Court is set aside and that of the trial court is restored.