In the year 1918 , Century Textiles and Industries Limited (Respondent No.1),had applied to the Improvement Trust under Section 32B under the provisions of the City of Bombay Improvement Act, 1898 for plot for construction of dwellings to the poorer class workers and the same was allotted.
In the year 1925, the 1898 Act was repealed by The Bombay Improvement
Trust Transfer Act, 1925
On 03.10.1928 a lease was granted in favour of Respondent No.1 with
respect to the plot given/ allotted
including the buildings therein for a period of 28 years w.e.f. 01.04.1927 at
a yearly rent of Rupee One ( under The Bombay Improvement Trust Transfer Act,
1925).
The lease was to expire on 31.03.1955 i.e. on completion of 28 years.
For a period of 51 years, neither the appellant nor the Respondent No.1
initiated any proceedings against each other – the Respondent No.1 for getting
the conveyance executed, as is being claimed now, and the appellant for eviction of the Respondent No.1 as
the lease period had expired. The fact remains that the Respondent No.1 has continued
in possession of the land and buildings during the time.
The Respondent No.1, on 14.08.2006, served a legal notice under Section
527 of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 18884 on the appellant stating
that as per the lease agreement, after expiry of lease period of 28 years, the
said property ought to be conveyed to the Respondent No.1 and, on failure to do
so within the specified period, the Respondent No.1 would be constrained to
file a suit. However, no suit was ever filed by the Respondent No.1.
In 2009, an application was filed by the Respondent No.1 for redevelopment
of the land in question to the appellant as they had closed the mill in 2008
and they wanted to shift the mill industry out of the land in question.
Another communication dated 21.04.2009 was sent by the Respondent No.1 to
the appellant, requesting for conveyance of the plot as per the lease deed. The
Assistant Commissioner (Estate) of the appellant was of the opinion that
Block-A should not be conveyed to the Respondent No.1 which is apparent from
the internal report dated 17.06.2013. A meeting between the parties was held in
March, 2014 after which, once again, the Respondent No.1 requested, vide letter
dated 27.03.2014, to execute a formal deed of conveyance. The Respondent No.1, vide
letter dated 30.11.2016, again called upon the appellant to execute a
formal deed of conveyance in view of Section 51(2) of the 1925 Act. When no
action was taken by the appellant, the Respondent No.1 filed writ petition
before the Bombay High Court in December, 2016 which was registered as W.P. No.
295 of 2017.
The reliefs claimed by means of the said petition ( ie W.P. No. 295 of 2017 of Bombay High Court
) are reproduced hereunder:
“29. …The Petitioners therefore
pray:
a) For a Writ of mandamus or a
writ in the nature of mandamus or for any
appropriate writ, order or
direction ordering and directing Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 (and their servants,
officers and agents) to recognize and proceed on the basis that the said
Premises being plot bearing C.S.No.1546 of Lower Parel Division and the
buildings standing thereon vest in Petitioner No. 1 by virtue of the provisions
of the Improvement Acts and as the absolute owners thereof.
b) For a writ of mandamus or a
writ in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or
direction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India ordering and directing
the Respondent No.1 (and its servants, officers and agents) to do all such acts
and things as may be necessary for formalizing the vesting of the said Premises
in Petitioner No.1 herein including by executing and thereafter registering
with the Sub Registrar of Assurances a Deed of Conveyance of the said Premises.
c) For a writ of mandamus or a
writ in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or
directions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India ordering and
directing the Respondent No.2 (and its servants, officers and agents) to do all
such acts and things as may be necessary for reflecting the name of Petitioner
No.1 in the records of the Collector of Mumbai in respect of the said plot of
land bearing C. S. No. 1546 of Lower Parel Division;
d) That pending the hearing and
final disposal of this Petition this Hon’ble Court be pleased to direct the Respondents
by themselves their servants, agents, officers and subordinates to consider all
applications from Petitioner No.1 as emanating from the owner of the said
Premises and deal with them in all matters relating to the said Premises as if
Petitioner No.1 were the owner thereof.
e) for ad-interim reliefs in
terms of prayer (d) above;
f) for costs of this Petition;
and
g) for such other and further
relief as the nature and circumstances of the case may require be passed.”
After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and based on material on
record, the High Court by the impugned judgment dated 14.03.2022, allowed the
writ petition and issued appropriate directions to the appellant to execute the
conveyance of the plot in question. Aggrieved by the same, MCGM is in appeal to
supreme court.
Appellants’
submissions:
A. Delay and Laches in filing the Writ Petition
The term of the lease dated 03.10.1928 in favour of the Respondent No.1
expired on 31.03.1955. According to the Respondent No.1, it was purportedly entitled
to a deed of conveyance on expiry of the aforesaid period. As such, the cause
of action would arise immediately after the expiry of the term of the lease.
Respondent No.1 took no legal action before any court of law, right from 1955
till the end of 2016 i.e. for 61 years when it filed the writ petition before the
High Court on 23.12.2016. Thus, it was submitted that the petition was highly
barred by laches and ought to have been dismissed on such grounds.
It was also submitted that in 2006, a legal notice dated 14.08.2006 under
Section 527 of the 1888 Act was issued by Respondent No.1, requiring the appellant
to execute the conveyance deed. The limitation provided for filing a suit under
Section 527 of the 1888 Act is six months. But Respondent No.1 took no action
thereafter for more than 10 years. No suit was ever filed by the Respondent
No.1. Knowing fully well that the limitation under Section 527 of the 1888 Act
had expired long back, they chose to file the writ petition in December, 2016
The submission is
that preferring a writ petition could not do away with the issue of limitation
which would arise while availing the statutory remedies available.
In such
circumstances, the High Court fell in error in entertaining the writ petition
and holding that the filing of the writ petition even after 61 years would not
suffer from delay or laches. In support of the said submissions, the following
two judgments are relied upon:
i) Shri Vallabh Glass Works Ltd. v. Union of India (1984) 3 SCC 362,
ii) SS Rathore v. State of MP (1989) 4 SCC 582
B. Effect of Section 51(2) read with Section 48 of the 1925 Act thereof
Section 51(2) which talks about default and determination of lease uses
the expression “shall convey” that in a situation where there is no default in
complying with the obligations under the lease document, the Board shall convey
the premises in favour of lessee on expiration of the lease. Whereas, Section
48(a) states that the lessee would keep the demised premises together with its
fixtures in good and substantial repair and condition during the term of the
lease and leave at the end thereof. The submission is that while reading both
the provisions together and in order to give a harmonious construction, the
expression “shall convey” must be read as “may convey”. It is also submitted
that in case Section 51(2) is read with the expression “shall convey”, then the
expression used in Section 48(a) that the lessee would leave at the end of the
term of the lease, would have no meaning and would be rendered as otiose or
superfluous. In support of the said submissions, the following decisions are
relied upon by the appellants:
i) CIT v Hindustan Bulk Carriers (2003) 3 SCC 57,
ii) Sultana Begum v. Prem Chand Jain (1997) 1 SCC
373,
iii) Sainik Motors v. State of Rajasthan (1962) 1 SCR
517
C. Concept of contracting out of the obligations and waiving of the
statutory rights by either of the parties to a contract.
Highlighting the concept of contracting out of obligations arising out of
a contract and waiving the statutory rights, it has been submitted that by now,
it is well-settled that the party can legally do so and such principle has been
duly recognised by this Court in the following decisions:
i) Lachoo Mal vs. Radhey Shyam (1971) 1 SCC 619
ii) Sita Ram Gupta v. Punjab National Bank (2008) 5 SCC 711
iii) HR Basavaraj v. Canara Bank (2010) 12 SCC 458
The appellants would be entitled to the benefit of said concept in the
facts and circumstances of the case.
D. Misreading by the High Court
According to the appellant, the High Court committed serious error by
misreading some of the relevant documents and reading something which is not stated
in such documents. Details of the same would be discussed while analysing the
said arguments. However, in particular, we may note that the pleadings have
referred to the Resolution of the Board dated 31.05.1927 as having been misread
and secondly the lease deed dated 03.10.1928 as also having been misread.
E. Relevancy of the internal notings and communications inter se officers
of the Corporations
The submission is that until and unless the order is approved by the
Competent Authority of the Corporation and issued by its Authorised Officer, Respondent
No.1 could not derive any advantage of any internal noting or communications of
the Corporation. The High Court committed error in relying upon such noting and
internal communications without there being a decision of the Competent
Authority duly communicated to the parties. In support of the said submissions,
reliance is placed upon the judgment in the case of Shanti Sports Club vs.
Union of India (2009) 15 SCC 705.
F. No legal rights accrued to the Respondent No.1 for vesting of
lease/conveyance of Block-A in terms of the 1925 Act
The 1925 Act replaced the 1898 Act, which stood repealed. Referring to the
Section 32I(2) of the 1898 Act which stood replaced by Section 51 of the 1925 Act,
it was argued that under the 1898 Act, it was mentioned that where no default
is made in the conditions of the lease, then on determination of the lease, all
the right, title, and interest of the Board shall vest in the employer free
from all liabilities. Whereas, under Section 51 of the 1925 Act, under sub-Section
(1) on default being made, the Board had the right to re-enter, and under
sub-Section (2), where no default is made, then on determination of the lease,
the Board shall convey the premises to the lessee at his cost and free of all
restrictions and liabilities imposed under the lease. It was, thus submitted
that under the 1925 Act, there was no automatic vesting but a separate deed of
conveyance to be executed at the cost of the lessee. This is the provision
where the submission that the word “shall convey” may be read as “may convey”
read with Section 48(a) of the 1925 Act. It was also submitted that the word
used “at his cost” in Section 51(2)
clearly meant that for a conveyance by the Board, the lessee would be
required to make a separate payment for such a conveyance.
G. Payment of cost of Scheme does
not entitle Respondents to any rights in the land itself.
The claim of the Respondent No.1 that it had incurred huge expenditure as
cost of the Scheme at the time of acquisition of the land by the Board entitled
it to a conveyance without any further payment of cost of the land, is
misplaced. The benefits admissible to the Respondent No.1 under the lease deed
were in return of the bearing of the cost of the Scheme. It only envisaged a
lease for 28 years, subject to terms and conditions recorded thereunder, but no
conveyance. For conveyance, separate costs were required to be paid at the time
of conveyance as per the scheme of the 1925 Act. It was submitted that the
Respondent No.1 filed writ petition only to make huge profits under the public
welfare scheme by usurping land valued at around Rs. 1200 crores without paying
a penny.
Respondents’ submissions:
A. The lease confers the right to conveyance on Respondent No.1
It is submitted that as the lease deed dated 03.10.1928 stated that the
Board agreed to alter Scheme No.51 ‘pursuant to the lessee’s request’, as such,
the lessee’s request which contained the following expression ‘convey to the
lessees the said portion of land at the expiration of the said term’, clearly
indicates that the appellant was obliged to execute the conveyance on
expiration of the lease. Even if no specific mention of the conveyance is mentioned
in the lease deed, since the appellant agreed to alter the Scheme No. 51, they
were now estopped from denying the right of Respondent No.1 to conveyance.
B. Board Resolution No. 325 and lease cannot be used to contract out of
Section 51(2) of the 1925 Act
The application dated 20.05.1927 submitted by Respondent No.1 for
alteration of the Scheme No.51, is reproduced in the Board Resolution No. 325
which accepted paragraph nos. 2 and 4 thereof. There was no occasion for the appellant
today to claim that they have contracted out of Section 51(2) of the 1925 Act. Neither
the lease deed mentioned specifically that
they were contracting out of Section 51(2) of the 1925 Act, nor at any
stage thereafter have the appellants taken this plea of contracting out.
C. Section 108(q) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
It is submitted that the appellants never raised this plea before the High
Court relying on Section 108(q) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 being
expressly excluded in the lease deed and therefore, giving them the right to
re-possession may not and should not be entertained by this Court.
D. Vesting and execution of conveyance is mandatory and cannot be
contracted out
The submission is that the provisions of Section 51(2) of 1925 Act as also
the provisions of Section 32I(2) of the 1898 Act are mandatory in nature as the
word used is ‘shall’ and therefore, there is no justification for the appellant
to raise a plea of contracting out of the terms of the lease or the statutory
provisions. In support of the said submission, the following judgments are
relied upon:
i) Murlidhar Agarwal and Anr. v State of Uttar
Pradesh and Others (1974) 2 SCC 472
ii) Devkaran Nenshi Tanna v. Manharlal Nenshi (1994) 5 SCC 681
iii) PTC (India) Financial Services Ltd. V Venkateswarlu
Kari (2022) 9 SCC 704
E. Obligations of lessee/employer, recompense and composite nature of
scheme
Our attention has been drawn to the Scheme as spelled out in the 1925 Act,
counsels for Respondent No.1 referred to various provisions and have submitted
that once the lessee discharges all his obligations, there is no reason why
under the statutory scheme, the land and building should not be conveyed to it.
It was further submitted that under the 1925 Act, the conveyance referred to is
akin to the vesting provided under Section 32I(2) of the 1898 Act.
F. Section 51 of the 1925 Act, a special provision prevails over Section
48(a) of the said Act which is a general provision
Referring to the provision under Section 48(a) and Section 51 of the 1925
Act, it has been vehemently argued that Section 48, being a general provision, deals
with standard conditions of the lease to be granted under the scheme. It only
postulates that at the end of the term of the lease, the lessee shall leave the
demised premises and their fixtures “in good and substantial repair and
condition”. It does not deal with as to what would happen during the period of lease
where there is a default or at the end of the lease where there has been no default.
It is Section 51 of the 1925 Act which deals with the above two situations and,
as such, this would be a special provision. Relying upon the following two
judgments, it was submitted that the special provision would prevail over the
general provision and, therefore, there was no option but for the appellant to
execute the conveyance.
i) Managing Director Chattisgarh State
Cooperative Bank Maryadit v Zila Sahkari Kendriya Bank Maryadit and Ors. (2020) 6 SCC 411
ii) J.K. Spinning and Weaving Mill Co Ltd. V State
of uttar Pradesh & Others SCC Online SC 16
G. Meaning of the word “premises”
Submission on behalf of the Respondent No.1 is that the word “premises”
would include both land and building, as defined in Section 3(gg) of the 1888
Act, which clearly means that the word “premises” would include both, buildings
and land. Since the word “premises” is not defined in the 1925 Act, Section 5 of
the 1925 Act provides that the words used in the 1925 Act but not defined
therein would have the same meaning as it does under the 1888 Act.
H. Public-Private Partnership
The Scheme as envisaged under the 1898 Act and the 1925 Act was an early
example of the Public-Private Partnership principle, by which the Board was
able to procure private funding for purposes of providing housing to
economically weaker section of the society in exchange for vesting or conveying
the land used for the Scheme. The Respondent No.1 having discharged its
obligations without a single default, was entitled to the benefit of vesting/conveyance
at the end of the Scheme or the lease in the present case.
I. A vested right cannot be divested by subsequent Conduct
The submission is that once Respondent No.1 had a right to conveyance at
the end of the term of the lease, and which was an indefeasible right, any
amount of delay, laches, or other conduct would not result in divesting of such
rights. Reliance was placed upon the judgement in the case of Rameshwar and Others vs. Jot Ram and
Another (1976)1 SCC 194.
J. The appellants recognized and acknowledged the ownership rights of
Respondent No.1
K. Alleged Delay
In trying to explain the delay for approaching the Court after 61 years,
it was submitted on behalf of the Respondent No.1 that the possession of the Respondent
No.1 has continued without any obstruction by the appellant. At no stage during
this entire period of 61 years, neither did the appellant sought possession of
the Block-A nor did they demand any rent for the same. The Respondent No.1, for
the first time, came to know that the Assistant Commissioner (Estate) of the
appellant had issued an opinion in June, 2013 that the premises should not be
conveyed to Respondent No.1. However, even that opinion was never communicated
to the Respondent No.1. The High Court has dealt with this aspect of the matter
and has found that there was no delay on part of the Respondent No.1 in
approaching the Court. Reliance has been placed on the judgment in State of
Maharashtra vs. Digambar (1995) 4 SCC 683. Section 51 provided for dealing
with the lessee where he committed default in the terms and conditions by way
of a right of re-entry to the Corporation and further, if there is no default
on the part of lessee, it would have a right of conveyance in favour of the
lessee at his cost.
Hon’ble Supreme
Courts observations & findings:
The core issues to be considered are two:
(i) Whether the appellant-Corporation was at all bound to convey the lease
land, on completion of the terms of the lease, in favour of the Respondent No.1
free from all restrictions and liabilities or not. If the answer is that there was
no compulsion for the appellant either under the statute or under the terms of
the lease deed to convey, then the Respondent No.1 would have no case at all.
If the answer is positive that they were required to convey the lease land,
then the interpretation of the words “at his cost” in Section 51(2) of the 1925
Act would be required.
(ii) The other question would be whether the writ petition filed before the
Bombay High Court suffered from delay and laches and was liable to be dismissed
on that ground alone as the cause of action had arisen in the year 1955 whereas
the writ petition was filed in the year 2016 after a delay of 61 (sixty-one)
years. Related issue to be considered is that a Notice under Section 527 of the
1888 Act was given in the year 2006 and, thereafter, no steps were taken for a
period of ten years for filing a suit even though the limitation prescribed was
six months as per the
above provisions. The Respondent No.1 instead of filing a suit preferred a
writ petition in the year 2016. Another inter-linked issue would be whether a
writ petition ought to have been entertained at all where the actual and real remedy
was by way of a civil suit for specific performance or for mandatory
injunction.
Lease of Block-A was executed on 03.10.1928 for a period of 28 years
effective from 01.04.1927 at a yearly rent of Re.1/-(Rupee One). As such, the
lease was to expire on 31.03.1955. A perusal of the terms and conditions stated
in the lease agreement would reveal that there is no such stipulation that on
the expiry of the period of the lease on 31.03.1955, after completion of 28
years, the appellants would be bound to convey the said land to Respondent No.1.
Based on the above resolution dated 31.05.1927 and the terms as incorporated in
the lease deed, the submission on behalf of the appellants is that there was
neither any decision taken by the Board to convey the land in question on expiration
of the lease nor does the lease agreement contain any such clause that the
appellants were bound to convey the land.
It is also vehemently submitted that the High Court completely fell in
error in reading the Board’s resolution as agreeing to convey the land on the expiration
of the lease and by interpreting the lease agreement to have a clause that the
Board would convey the land on the expiration of the lease Insofar as the lease
deed is concerned, the High Court read the narration of the facts relating to
the application filed by Respondent No.1 for alteration dated 20.05.1927 to be
a term of the lease to mean that on expiration of the lease, there would be a
conveyance.
In fact, there is no such stipulation in the terms and conditions of the lease
deed regarding the conveyance. This was a clear misreading by the High Court. The
lease deed dated 03.10.1928, nowhere recites that the land comprising in
Block-A would be conveyed at the expiration of the lease term of 28 years
provided there was no default on the part of the lessee as provided in Section
51(2) of the 1925 Act. The High Court, while referring to the narration of facts
in the initial part of the lease deed, has misinterpreted the same to be a
condition incorporated in the lease deed for conveyance at the end of the
period of lease i.e. on expiration of 28 years.
…………………The High Court, thus, fell in error in interpreting both the
documents otherwise.
Section 51(2) of the said Act being a special provision whereas Section
48(a) thereof is a general provision, the special provision will prevail over
the general provision. We may not agree with the above submission of Respondent
No.1 as submitted but would rather read both the provisions and test whether
they could co-exist and be construed harmoniously. If Section 48(a) and Section
51(2) of the 1925 Act are to be interpreted harmoniously, the net result is
that under general provisions, the lessee has to leave the premise on
completion of the period of lease, however, it will have a right to get the
conveyance executed at the end of the lease, provided there has been no default,
after paying the cost of the said premise.
Well-settled principles of statutory interpretation
demand that no provision of a statute should be rendered nugatory or
superfluous. A statute must be construed as a coherent whole, ensuring that
each part has meaningful content and that the legislative scheme remains workable.
Where two provisions appear to be in tension, the proper course is to adopt a
construction that reconciles them, allowing both to operate and giving effect
to the underlying legislative intent.
Such a reading is consistent with the accepted principle that a statutory
provision should not be construed in a manner that would reduce another provision
to a “dead letter.” No non-obstante clause or hierarchical superiority is
artificially read into the statute …………..………These principles were reiterated by
a three-Judge Bench of this Court in CIT (supra).
The relevant paragraphs are reproduced hereunder:
“14.A construction which reduces the statute to a futility has to be
avoided. A statute or any enacting provision therein must be so construed as to
make it effective and operative on the principle expressed in the maxim ut res
magis valeat quam pereat i.e. a liberal construction should be put upon written
instruments, so as to uphold them, if possible, and carry into effect the
intention of the parties. …………
15. A statute is designed to be workable and the interpretation thereof by
a court should be to secure that object unless crucial omission or clear
direction makes that end unattainable………..
16. The courts will have to reject that construction which will defeat the
plain intention of the legislature even though there may be some in exactitude
in the language used. ……………..
17. If the choice is between two interpretations, the narrower of which
would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation, we should avoid
a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility, and should rather
accept the bolder construction, based on the view that Parliament would
legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result.
……………………………
18. The statute must be read as a whole and one provision of the Act
should be construed with reference to other provisions in the same Act so as to
make a consistent enactment of the whole statute.
19. The court must ascertain the intention of the legislature by directing
its attention not merely to the clauses to be construed but to the entire
statute; it must compare the clause with other parts of the law and the setting
in which the clause to be interpreted occurs. …………. Such a construction has the
merit of avoiding any inconsistency or repugnancy either within a section or
between two different sections or provisions of the same statute. It is the
duty of the court to avoid a head-on clash between two sections of the same
Act. …….
20. Whenever it is possible to do so, it must be done to construe the
provisions which appear to conflict so that they harmonise. It should not be
lightly assumed that Parliament had given with one hand what it took away with
the other.
21. The provisions of one section of the statute cannot be used to defeat
those of another unless it is impossible to effect reconciliation between them.
Thus a construction that reduces one of the provisions to a “useless lumber” or
“dead letter” is not a harmonised construction. To harmonise is not to destroy.”
This reconciliation preserves the intention of the legislature, avoids
destructive interpretations, and provides a coherent, just, and practical
reading of the statute.
In light of the above discussion, it becomes evident that neither the
statutory framework in force nor the terms of the lease deed imposed any
obligation upon the appellant to execute a conveyance in favour of the Respondent
No.1. While the Respondent No.1 has sought to rely upon selective readings of
the statutory provisions and the Board’s resolutions, a harmonious and
contextual interpretation of Sections 48(a) and 51(2) of the 1925 Act, as well
as the clear absence of any covenant to that effect in the lease deed, unequivocally
demonstrates that no vested right to conveyance arose on the expiration of the
lease. …In absence of any express
statutory mandate or contractual stipulation, the claim for compulsory
conveyance at the end of the lease term must fail.
There is yet another aspect of the matter to be considered. The Respondent
No.1 had a statutory remedy of filing a suit under Section 527 of the 1988 Act
which they could have availed. In fact, the Respondent No.1 proceeded in that
direction by giving a notice to file a suit but never filed the suit although
limitation for the same was six months. ……….Instead, the Respondent No.1 has
shown utmost craftiness and lack of bona fide in preferring the writ petition
before the High Court in 2016 as it is clearly a route adopted to subvert the
long delay of sixty-one
years, which we do not find condonable, given the conduct of the
Respondent No.1 throughout.
………. nullify the intended social function of the property and transform a
carefully crafted scheme of public welfare into a mere instrument of private profit.
This conduct amounts to an abuse of
beneficial legislation. The 1925 Act was clearly intended to secure broader
societal goals—better sanitation, improved living standards, and well-planned
urban growth that includes and benefits marginalized communities. Allowing
Respondent No.1 to disregard these obligations would open the door to hollowing
out the protections and advantages established by the statute. It would set a
precedent where statutory schemes designed to uplift vulnerable groups could be
co-opted for purely commercial ends, undermining the trust and faith that must
exist between public authorities, private actors, and the most vulnerable segments
of the population.
In essence, the entire arrangement
is anchored on a quid pro quo: the property is leased on special terms, with
minimal rent and under carefully prescribed conditions, to ensure that the
less-privileged receive tangible benefits. When the lessee attempts to convert
this arrangement into a vehicle for commercial gain, it repudiates the
fundamental bargain. The public trust reposed in the private entity to serve a
greater good is thus betrayed. This not only harms the class of beneficiaries
whom the legislation and agreement were designed to protect, but also imperils
the broader public interest by allowing beneficial legislative frameworks to be
distorted and exploited contrary to their genuine purpose.
[ CIVIL APPEAL NO.6667 OF 2023-Decided on 7th
January 2025 -Hon’ble Mr. Justice Vikram Nath & Hon’ble Mr. Justice
Prasanna B. Varale-2025 INSC 36, Reportable
]